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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 58 WINTER 1984 NUMBER 2
SYMPOSIUMt
THE LAW OF THE SEA CRISIS
Louis B. SOHN*
Mankind has been preoccupied with the sea from the very be-
ginning. The first human beings that came to the shores of the sea
found it fascinating, enticing, and dangerous. Some merely fished
from the shore. Others, more venturesome, sailed the sea, first
crossing small bays, then small seas, such as the Aegean Sea, later
crossing bigger ones like the Mediterranean, and finally venturing
with Columbus across the Atlantic. Now we are thinking about
space, and flying from the earth to the moon or to other
places-but still for us the greatest adventure is the sea. People
forget that 70% of the earth's surface is covered by the oceans. By
a recent Presidential decree, the United States increased its area
by more than one-half through the addition of a 200-mile economic
zone around its mainland and its many Pacific islands.1 More than
2 million square nautical miles of territory were added to the
tThe articles in this Symposium were adapted from the Law of the Sea Symposium,
held at St. John's University School of Law on September 24, 1983, under the sponsorship
of the Society of Comparative and International Law of the St. John's University School of
Law and the American Society of International Law. The author wishes to acknowledge that
most of the footnotes were added by the staff of the Review on their own initiative.
* Woodruff Professor of International Law, University of Georgia School of Law; Bemis
Professor of International Law, Emeritus, Harvard Law School.
I Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,605 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Proclamation
No. 5030]; see also Statement by the President, 19 WEEKLY Comp. PRES. Doc. 383, 383 (Mar.
10, 1983), reprinted in 22 LL.M. 464, 464 (1983) (indicating that United States will continue
to seek an international regime of deep seabed mining); White House Fact Sheet on United
States Ocean Policy, 22 LL.M. 461, 461 (1983) (mining of minerals from seabed within the
exclusive economic zone could have important strategic and economic consequences for the
United States) [hereinafter cited as White House Fact Sheet].
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United States just by the President's pen,2 without a costly war of
conquest of the kind that was common in previous years.
For a long time, navigation was the primary use of the sea;3
later, fishing in coastal waters and in the high seas became equally
important.4 Of course, wherever there is human activity, regulation
by law follows. Since the early days, various nations have regulated
activities on the oceans, giving rise to commercial maritime law.5
The international law of the sea developed well for a while; but, in
the 15th century, dissension arose concerning the right to own the
ocean or to exclude others from vast ocean areas.' Finally, the rule
was established that there is a freedom of the seas, that all nations
may navigate the oceans, and that nations such as Spain and Por-
2 Proclamation No. 5030, supra note 1. Proclamation No. 5030 appears to be the culmi-
nation of a recent trend to extend American influence into international waters. See, e.g.,
Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1473 (Supp. V 1981) [herein-
after cited as the Mineral Resources Act]. The Mineral Resources Act provides for Govern-
ment regulation of deep seabed mining activities engaged in by citizens of the United
States, including corporations. Id. § 1411(a)(1). Citizens are required to obtain licenses
before engaging in commercial activity or exploration within the area of the continental
shelf. See id. The Mineral Resources Act, however, does not assert exclusive jurisdiction or
sovereignty over any areas or resources in the deep seabed. Id. § 1402(a)(2).
3 R. Dupuy, THE LAW OF THE SEA 9, 11 (1974).
4 See P. FENN, THE ORIGIN OF THE RIGHT OF FISHERY IN TERRITORIAL WATERS 27-29
(1926); S. RIESENFELD, THE PROTECTION OF COASTAL FISHERIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
1-2 (1942).
5 See R. Dupuy, supra note 3, at 6-7. One of the oldest collections of maritime laws,
dating from about the ninth century, was compiled on the island of Rhodes in the Aegean
Sea. See W. ASHBURNER, THE RHODIAN SEA-LAW cxii-cxiii (1909). This legal system was fur-
ther developed by the Hanseatic League, an association of seafaring states formed in the
13th century, which dominated maritime trade in northern Europe for several centuries. See
C. COLOMBos, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 32 (6th rev. ed. 1967); see also F.
SANBORN, ORIGINS OF EARLY ENGLISH MARITIME AND COMMERCIAL LAW 178-80 (1930).
6 See T. FULTON, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE SEA 534-41 (1976) (historical development of
territorial waters); Walz, The Territorial Sea, in MAJOR ISSUES OF THE LAW OF THE SEA 28,
32 (D. Larson ed. 1976) (origin of territorial claims). During the Middle Ages, the Italian
republics appropriated vast stretches of the high seas. Walz, supra, at 29. The Scandinavian
countries laid similar claims in the Baltic Sea. Id. During the Age of Exploration, the 15th
and 16th centuries, Spain and Portugal divided the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian oceans be-
tween themselves. T. FULTON, supra, at 105-08, 339. Their claims were formally recognized
by the Vatican's issuance of bulls. Id. at 105. Having obtained formal recognition of their
claims, these nations sought to defend them by force; unlicensed travel on Spanish-claimed
waters was punishable by death and confiscation. Id. at 106. But neither papal bulls nor
s~vere sanctions could preserve the vast territorial claims laid by Spain and Portugal. See
id. at 107. Such claims were vigorously challenged by the emerging naval powers-Great
Britain and Holland. Id. at 106-08; Bouchez, The Freedom of the High Seas: A Reappraisal,
in THE FUTURE OF THE LAW OF THE SEA 21, 21 (1973); see also R. ECKERT, THE ENCLOSURE OF
OCEAN RESOURCES 66 (1979) (statement by Queen Elizabeth that "use of the sea and air is
common to all").
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tugal could not lawfully exclude other nations from the oceans that
border America and Southern Asia.7 This was a good rule for a
long time, as long as the seas were inexhaustible, and anything one
did to the sea had little apparent effect on it. But with the growth
of world population and of the use of the oceans, more and more
regulation became necessary. The League of Nations attempted to
do something about this in the 1930's and was able to make some
progress by codifying the practice of extending the sovereignty of a
coastal state to a narrow strip of the bordering area of the sea, the
so-called territorial sea." Preliminary agreement was reached on
some basic rules, but the member nations could not agree on
whether the width of the territorial sea should be limited to 3
miles." The United Nations began to deal with the question of the
oceans in 1949 as one of its first activities.10 I was asked by that
international body to collect the first laws about the new regula-
tions that dealt with regions of the seas that extended beyond 3
miles, such as those relating to contiguous zones and continental
shelves.11 By 1956, the International Law Commission had pro-
duced drafts, 2 and in 1958 an international conference had agreed
on a much broader codification of the law than the one attempted
7 The principle of freedom of the sea primarily is attributed to the seminal work of
Hugo Grotius, see H. GRoTws, MAmE LmiERUM (1608), which prevailed over the work of John
Selden, see J. SELDEN, MARE CLAUSUM (1635), in the "battle of the books." See Scott, Intro-
ductory Note to H. GROTuS, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEA at viii-ix (Margoffin transl. 1916).
8 See C. COLOMOS, supra note 5, at 103-04; Waz, supra note 6, at 33.
' Final Act of the Conference for the Codification of International Law, April 12, 1930,
League of Nations Doc. C.351 M.145 1930 V, at 123-37, 165-69 (1930); see Report of the
Second Committee (Territorial Sea), Annex El to the Final Act of the Conference for the
Codification of International Law, reprinted in 24 AM. J. INT'L L. 253, 253-57 (Supp. 1930)
[hereinafter cited as Report of the Second Committee]. The responses of 37 nations were
noted in the Report of the Second Committee. Report of the Second Committee, supra, at
134-37. Of the 37, 19 (including Great Britain, Japan and the United States, the major mari-
time powers of that period) favored a 3-mile limit and 16 favored a limit of some other size;
there were two abstentions. Id. at 136-37. Thus, the League of Nations failed to arrive at a
rule recognizing limitations of sovereignty over territorial waters. See S. SwA zTAuBER, THE
THR E-MILE LIimT OF TERRrrORAL SEAs 137 (1972); Reeves, The Codification of the Law of
Territorial Waters, 24 AM. J. INT'L L. 486, 488 (1930).
10 In 1948, the General Assembly, in establishing the International Law Commission,
adopted a resolution requesting that the Commission give top priority to the topic of the
"regime of territorial waters." G.A. Res. 374, U.N. Doc. A/1251, at 66 (1950), reprinted in
[1948-1949] U.N.Y.B. 952, U.N. Sales No. 1950.111.
11 See Laws and Regulations on the Regime of the High Seas, U.N. Legislative Series,
Vol. I, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/1 (1951).
'2 See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 11 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 9) at 12-46, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956), reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 256-64, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add.1.
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by the League.' 3 This conference produced four conventions: 4 one
on the high seas,1 one on the territorial sea and the contiguous
zone, 1 6 one on fishing,7 and one on the continental shelf.'"
It was expected in 1958 that the new regime would last a long
time, but it soon became apparent that this was not possible. In-
ternational activities multiplied in the next 10 years to an astound-
ing degree. The oceans became overrun by fishing boats of a size
never before imagined. These new factory ships practically emp-
tied vast areas of the sea, leaving behind an oceanic desert virtu-
ally without living resources. Fish, which were always thought to
be an inexhaustible resource, started disappearing." Pollution
from tankers and dumping of wastes from the overpopulated
coastal cities also slowly started destroying vast areas of the sea.2°
As traffic multiplied, more disasters occurred, some not far from
here; vessels of ever-increasing size collided with each other, some-
times resulting in a great loss of life, and often causing oil spills
and pollution. Examples of such disasters spring easily to mind.
The collision of the Andrea Doria with the Stockholm occurred
"1 The first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was con-
vened in February 1958 in Geneva. See C. COLOMBOS, supra note 5, at 71. The Conference
approved an extension of sovereign rights over seabed resources to the limits of the conti-
nental shelf. Id. at 76. It also defined the term "continental shelf" as including the seabed
adjacent to the coast up to the water depth of 200 meters or, beyond that limit, wherever
seabed resources could be exploited. Id. at 71; see infra text accompanying notes 102-03; see
also Amerasinghe, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 6
UNITAR NEws 2, 3 (1974) (discussing accomplishments and failures of first conference).
14 Final Act of the [First] United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 2 Official
Records, at 146-47, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13]L.58 (1958). All four conventions have been rati-
fied by the United States.
18 Convention on the High Seas, opened for signature Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312,
T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82.
16 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, opened for signature
Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
" Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas,
opened for signature Apr. 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285.
18 Convention on Continental Shelf, opened for signature Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471,
T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 449 U.N.T.S. 311. [hereinafter cited as Continental Shelf Convention].
1I F. CHRISTY & A. SCOTT, THE COMMON WEALTH IN OCEAN FISHERIES 3 (1965); see R.
ECKERT, supra note 6, at 147. The number of fish caught yearly more than tripled between
1958 and 1975. R. ECKERT, supra note 6, at 121. It is estimated that by the year 2000,
current levels will have doubled. See Pabst, Fisheries, in MAJOR ISSUES OF THE LAW OF THE
SEA 84, 85 (D. Larson ed. 1976). But see Carroz, The Richness of the Sea: Fisheries, in THE
FUTURE OF THE LAW OF THE SEA 79, 79 (1973) (living resources of the sea are still
underharvested).
10 Campbell, Marine Pollution, in MAJOR ISSUES OF THE LAW OF THE SEA 107, 108 (D.
Larson ed. 1976).
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near Nantucket in 1956.21 Heavy pollution of beaches in England
and France resulted from the sinking of the oil tanker Torrey Can-
yon in 1967,22 and there were several subsequent spills as well, in-
cluding those from the Argo Merchant and the Amoco Cadiz, and
from oil wells in the Santa Barbara Channel, the Gulf of Mexico,
and the North Sea.23 Consequently, people became aware that en-
vironmental concerns were as important a problem as the conser-
vation of fish.24
The other problem was the creeping jurisdiction of the coastal
states. Three miles of territorial waters were not enough for these
states; they wanted 6, 12, 50, even 100 miles.26 Of course, the major
countries, comprising not only the major maritime powers but also
the large countries of South Asia, such as India, Indonesia, Paki-
stan and Bangladesh, depend greatly on international maritime
trade. All of these countries became concerned about the fact that
if more and more of the coastal states were to expand their juris-
diction into the high seas, they would start regulating maritime
commerce, making life more difficult and more costly for navies
and the commercial ships of other countries, and causing numerous
international incidents. Slowly, it was realized that something had
to be done to bring the law of the sea more completely up to date.
Then, an additional discovery was made. In 1967, Ambassador
Pardo, who was from the small country of Malta, brought to the
attention of the General Assembly the fact that on the ocean bot-
tom, 5 kilometers down, there lie great riches-the so-called man-
ganese nodules.26 Although the nodules, when first brought up
from the ocean depths, have a large proportion of manganese,
2' See N.Y. Times, July 26, 1956, at Al, col. 4.
22 See Brown, The Lessons of the Torrey Canyon, 21 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 113, 114
(1968); Nanda, The "Torrey Canyon" Disaster: Some Legal Aspects, 44 DEN. L.J. 400, 400-
01 (1967).
2' See Cycon, Calming Troubled Waters: The Developing International Regime to
Control Operational Pollution, 13 J. MAR. L. & COM. 35, 35 (1980). It has been estimated
that 1,370,000 tons of oil are discharged into the ocean annually. Id.
2 See Goldberg & Menzel, Oceanic Pollution, in WHO PROTECTS THE OCEAN? 37-38 (J.
Hargrove ed. 1975).
2' See, e.g., BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE & RESEARCH, OFFICE OF THE GEOGRAPHER, U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 36, NATIONAL CLAIMS TO MARrrIME JURISDICTION 1-141 (2d rev. ed.
1974); R. Dupuy, supra note 3, at 54-55; R. ECKERT, supra note 6, at 1-5; see also Walz,
supra note 6, at 28-34. Statistics reveal that though only 38 states laid claim to territorial
seas of 12 miles or more in 1967, 78 countries had made such claims by 1974. Walz, supra
note 6, at 31 (table 11-2).
26 22 U.N. GAOR (1515th mtg.) at 2, U.N. Doc. A/C.1IPV.1515 (1967).
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manganese is but one of their components, the others being nickel,
copper and cobalt-all of which are very important for a number
of industrial processes. 27 These nodules are lying down there by
the millions, maybe by the trillions, of tons,28 and technology has
reached the point where they could be exploited by combinations
of devices. There are, for example, elaborate computers capable of
l6eeping a ship steady in a particular spot by computing the speed
of the winds, the waves, and the ship, and the effect of the cur-
rents. This permits the miner to use complex devices to go to the
bottom of the sea, pick out the nodules by utilizing different kinds
of processes, and bring them up to the ship, regardless of what
happens on the surface of the sea.2 9 Another ship can then process
the nodules at sea or take them to shore to extract the desired
minerals from the nodules.30 Ambassador Pardo noted that in the
past, the seabed was an area that did not belong to any nation.
The United Nations, Ambassador Pardo asserted, should, in the
27 See Anand, Winds of Change in the Law of the Sea, in LAW OF THE SEA: CARACAS
AND BEYOND 36, 43 (R. Anand ed. 1980); Murphy, The Politics of Manganese Nodules: In-
ternational Considerations and Domestic Legislation, 16 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 531, 534
(1979). There are many industrial uses for manganese, nickel, copper, and cobalt. For exam-
ple, steel cannot be manufactured without manganese. See SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND
INSULAR AFFAIRS, 94TH CONG., 1ST SESS., OCEAN MANGANESE NODULES 50 (Comm. Print
1975) [hereinafter cited as OCEAN MANGANESE NODULES]; Pietrowski, Hard Minerals on the
Deep Ocean Floor: Implications for American Law and Policy, 19 WM. & MARY L. REV. 43,
44 (1977). Nickel-alloy steel, which has enhanced heat resistant properties, is used in petro-
leum refining, as well as in the manufacture of jet engines, turbines, and pollution control
equipment. OCEAN MANGANESE NODULES, supra, at 47. Because of its high level of conduc-
tivity, copper is used extensively in electrical equipment, wire tubing, and sheeting. Id. at
49. Cobalt is used in space-age alloys. See id. at 52.
28 Sharma, Exclusive Economic Zone in Policy Perspective, in LAW OF THE SEA: CA-
RACAS AND BEYOND 209 (R. Anand ed. 1980); see United Nations, Dep't of Economic and
Social Affairs, Mineral Resources of the Sea, at 14, U.N. Doc. STIECA/125 (1970); J. MERo,
THE MINERAL RESOURCES OF THE SEA 278 (1965); Murphy, supra note 27, at 533.
28 See SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT
ON DEEP SEA BED HARD MINERALS ACT, S. REP. No. 754, 3-5 (Comm. Print 1976). Sophisti-
cated ship technology includes devices for acoustic, optic, and magnetic observation. Id. at
5. Three methods for recovering nodules from the ocean floor are presently in use. See
OCEAN MANGANESE NODULES, supra note 27, at 15. The first method utilizes an air-lift pump
to vacuum nodules from the seabed. Id. The second method involves a hydraulic lift, which
functions in much the same way as the air-lift pump, but requires pumped water to bring
the nodules to the surface. Id. at 18. The third, and most widely used, device is the mechan-
ical lift, or continuous-line bucket system, which dredges up nodules by dragging a bucket
along the ocean bottom. Id.
8 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/25, at 22 (1974). Once brought to the surface, the elemental
components of the nodules are extracted and refined through procedures such as chemical
leaching and hydrometallurgical techniques. Whitney, Environmental Regulation of United
States Deep Seabed Mining, 19 WM. & MARY L. REV. 77, 79 (1977).
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name of mankind, declare it the common heritage of mankind, and
should not permit the major powers to take it over as they had
taken over Africa in the 19th century.3 1 That, of course, struck a
very responsive chord among the developing countries that had re-
cently joined the United Nations and were looking for a way to
further their own progress; they asked to have the matter stud-
ied.32 A committee was established for this purpose, first tempora-
rily,33 and then on a permanent basis. 4 The committee published a
comprehensive report that said, in effect, yes, there are riches on
the deep seabed and they require some international regulation.5
By this time, the major powers discovered another important
fact, namely, that the only way to prevent the further creeping ap-
propriation of the ocean by coastal states would be to have an in-
ternational conference that would establish some stability in the
law in this area. They persuaded the General Assembly to add sev-
eral important topics to the agenda of the future Law of the Sea
Conference. The Conference was asked to deal not only with deep
seabed mining, but also to reconsider the whole law of the sea and
31 22 U.N. GAOR (1515th mtg.) at 1, 12, 14, U.N. Doc. A/C.l/PV.1515 (1967). The Eu-
ropean colonial powers, including Great Britain, France, Belgium, Germany, and Italy, fol-
lowing in the footsteps of Portugal and Spain, ventured to Africa to conquer and divide the
continent. See COLONIAL RULE IN AFRICA 7-8 (B. Fetter ed. 1979).
32 Pietrowski, supra note 27, at 55 (Ambassador Pardo's proposal viewed by developing
countries as a way to secure their proportionate share of seabed mineral riches). The devel-
oping nations support common global ownership of the riches of the sea, since such a
scheme would ensure that they share in the exploitation of those riches. Alexander, Cam-
eron & Nixon, The Costs of Failure at the Third Law of the Sea Conference, 9 J. MAR. L. &
COM. 1, 2 (1977). This concern is related to the broader issue of closing the prosperity gap
between the developed and the developing countries. Id. at 20.
" The Ad Hoc Committee to Study the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean
Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction was established on December 18, 1967.
G.A. Res. 2340, 22 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 14, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1968).
U, In response to the recommendation of the Ad Hoc Committee, see U.N. Doc. A/7230,
at 19 (1968), the General Assembly established in 1968 the Committee on the Peaceful Uses
of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction (the Sea-
Bed Committee), G.A. Res. 2467A, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 15, U.N. Doc. A/7218
(1969).
3' The Sea-Bed Committee's second report, see 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 21) at 14,
U.N. Doc. A/8021 (1970), led to the adoption by the General Assembly in 1970 of the Decla-
ration of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof,
Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction. See G.A. Res. 2749, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
28) at 24, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971). This resolution provided for the establishment of an
international regime regarding the seabed and its resources, and an appropriate interna-
tional machinery to effectuate it, by means of "an international treaty of a universal charac-
ter, generally agreed upon." Id. para. 9.
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to determine whether it could be recodified.36 Some 150 nations
went to work (almost 170 by the time the task was finished) and
ultimately produced a treaty that was almost 160 pages long, con-
taining more than 400 articles (320 in the main text, and more
than 120 in the annexes), and which dealt with almost all of the
areas and problems of the sea. 7 There were twenty-five original
subjects on the agenda, and the Conference dealt with every one of
them. It would be impossible to consider all twenty-five in this Ar-
ticle, so just a few of them will be sketched briefly. Professor Janis
and Professor Biblowit consider some of these problems in greater
detail."8
Starting from the shoreline and moving seaward, one comes
first to the territorial sea, over which a coastal state has, in princi-
ple, the same sovereignty it has over its land. 9 But there is an
important difference: it was agreed long ago, and reaffirmed in
1958, that foreign ships should have the right of innocent passage
through such waters.40 There has been, however, a longstanding
controversy over the extent of the territorial sea.41 The United
States and the United Kingdom had always claimed a very limited
expanse because they wanted to have freedom of navigation be-
36 G.A. Res. 2750C, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 26, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971).
" Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982; [hereinafter
cited as LOS Convention]; see United Nations, The Law of the Sea: United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea, with Index and Final Act of the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Pub. Sales No. E. 83. V. 3, at 1-157 (1983).
'a See generally Biblowit, Deep Seabed Mining: The United States and the Common
Heritage of Mankind, 58 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 267 (1983); Janis, The Seas: Rules and Rulers,
58 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 307 (1983).
'9 See C. COLOMBOS, supra note 5, at 47; O'Connell, The Juridical Nature of the Terri-
torial Sea, [1970] BRrr. Y.B. INr'L L. 303, 353.
40 Slonim, The Right of Innocent Passage and the 1958 Geneva Convention on the
Law of the Sea, 5 COLUM. J. TmNSNAT'L L. 96, 96 (1966); cf. R. DuPuy, supra note 3, at 89
(other than the maritime right of innocent passage, a state has equal sovereignty over land
and sea); J. PREScorr, THE POLrrICAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE Oc EANs 30 (1975) (right of inno-
cent passage for alien vessels through territorial seas has no counterpart on land). The an-
cient maritime doctrine of innocent passage provides that foreign vessels may navigate
freely through a coastal state's territorial waters only if such passage is not prejudicial to the
peace, good order or security of that state. LOS Convention, supra note 37, arts. 18-19, at 6-
7; see K. KOH, STmAITS IN INTERNATIONAL NAVIGATION 167 (1982); McConchie & Reid, Cana-
dian Foreign Policy and International Straits, in CANAD N FOREIGN POLICY AND THE LAW
OF THE SEA 159 (1977). This right also includes the right to stop and weigh anchor, if neces-
sitated by either a force majeure or danger. See C. COLOMBOS, supra note 5, at 132.
41 See W. EXTAVOUR, THE EXCLUSivE ECONOMIC ZoN 49 (1979); K. KOH, supra note 40,
at 3-4; Alexander, Cameron & Nixon, supra note 32, at 4.
[Vol. 58:237
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yond the territorial waters of other nations.42 Other countries, such
as Spain, for a long time claimed 6 miles.43 The Soviet Union, fol-
lowing the precedents of old czarist Russia, claimed 12 miles.44 The
new Latin American countries claimed even greater expanses of
the sea because of another development, namely, the continental
shelf doctrine, 5 which some of them could not employ because
there was no continental shelf off their shorelines. 46 Nevertheless,
since most continental shelves extend approximately 200 miles
from the shore, these nations also claimed 200 miles of territorial
waters.47 They claimed the 200-mile zone as territorial sea because
that was the only theory they could invoke as a basis for the
coastal states' jurisdictional claims at sea.48 This 200-mile limit was
very beneficial for them, because most of the fisheries off their
shores were within that distance.49 The major powers were very up-
set, however, because the existence of a 200-mile territorial sea
under national sovereignty would lead to restrictions on foreign
navigation, mitigated only by the nebulous right of innocent pas-
sage. Innocent passage was long considered a subjective term, since
each coastal state was permitted to determine for itself what con-
42 See C. COLOMBOS, supra note 5, at 51; T. FULTON, supra note 6, at 650-52; L. JUDA,
OCEAN SPACE RIGHTS: DEVELOPING U.S. POLICY 2-3 (1975).
43 See T. FULTON, supra note 6, at 664 (Spanish claim to 6-mile limit in 18th century);
Heinzen, The Three-Mile Limit: Preserving the Freedom of the Seas, 11 STAN. L. REV. 597,
642 (1959) (Spain is one of the few nations still claiming 6 miles of territorial waters in
1958).
44 See S. RESENFELD, supra note 4, at 162 (Russian decree of 1911 establishing 12-mile
zone on Pacific Coast). The Soviet Union established a 12-mile zone in the Arctic Ocean,
including the White Sea, in 1921, and in 1957 extended the overall boundary of its territo-
rial waters from 3 to 12 miles. Id. at 163-64; K. KoH, supra note 40, at 68. For a detailed
study of the 3-mile limit and of deviations from it, see S. SwARz AuBER, supra note 9, at
51-177.
41 See Z. SLOUXA, INTERNATIONAL CUSTOM AND THE CONTINENTAL SHELF 43-44 (1968).
The continental shelf doctrine originated with President Truman's famous proclamation in
1945. See Proclamation No. 2667, 3 C.F.R. 67 (1945). In that proclamation, the United
States claimed exclusive rights to explore and exploit not only the seabed and subsoil adja-
cent to its coastline, but also the seabed and subsoil beyond its territorial waters. Id.
46 See R. ANAND, LEGAL REGIME OF THE SEA-BED AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 43
(1975).
47 See B. SMETHERMAN & R. SMETHERMAN, TERRITORIAL SEAS AND INTER-AMERICAN RE-
LATIONS 5-6 (1974) (tracing the history of the disputed claim by the Latin American coun-
tries to the 200-mile zone).
4' See Garcia-Amador, The Latin American Contribution to the Development of the
Law of the Sea, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 33, 35 (1974); Hollick, Origins of 200-mile Offshore
Zones, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 494, 495 (1977).
4' See R. ANAND, supra note 46, at 147; J. PRESCOTT, supra note 40, at 117-18; 1 A.
SZEKELY, LATIN AMERICA AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF THE SEA 41 (1976).
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duct was harmful to its peace, good order, and security, and there-
fore to consider it not innocent.5 Consequently, various countries
have developed different definitions of innocent passage. Spain, for
instance, out of concern for its beaches, forbade big tankers to
come close to its shores because they were dangerous. Algeria,
which was always a big proponent of radical doctrines in interna-
tional law, discovered that Spain contemplated prohibiting ships
carrying liquified Algerian gas to approach the Spanish shore of
the Straits of Gibraltar because they were too dangerous. In view
of that threat to its exports, Algeria shifted its position and be-
came one of the major proponents of freedom of transit through
narrow sea passages.51
Many back-and-forth shifts of this kind, affecting several rules
of international maritime law, occurred during the Conference, be-
cause the countries were looking out not simply for group interests
but for their own national interests. Within the Conference, apart
from the usual regional groups and the large group, the so-called
"Group of 77, ''52 there were the following groups: the developing
countries, the coastal states, the fishing states, the states with
broad continental shelves, and the so-called territorialists-those
nations that wanted a territorial sea of 200 miles. 3 The group of
:0 See Slonim, supra note 40, at 100.
I See U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.20, 3 Official Records, Third United Nations Con-
ference on the Law of the Sea 198, 198-99, U.N. Sales No. E.75.V.5 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as UNCLOS Official Records]. Algeria, along with Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Romania, Tur-
key and Yugoslavia, proposed a very liberal set of guidelines for the transit passage of
merchant and military ships through straits and semi-enclosed seas. Id. at 198. The Algerian
proposal provided for free, unhampered passage of ships through semi-enclosed waters, for
international navigation, and for unimpeded overflight for aircraft. Id. at 199. These rights
were unaffected by the presence of islands or archipelagic states within the waters. Id.
Spain, on the other hand, joined with Cyprus, Greece, Indonesia, Malaysia, Morocco, Re-
public of the Philippines and Yemen, to propose a much more limited draft article for navi-
gation through straits. See Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea Bed
and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
21) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/9021 (1973). The proposal concerned balancing the rights of interna-
tional navigation against the interests of the coastal states and included a conditional right
of passage providing for discretion in the coastal states control over what vessels could pass
through their waters. Id.
52 See Evriviades, The Third World's Approach to the Deep Seabed, 11 OCEAN DEv. &
INT'L L. 201, 241 n.4 (1982). The term "Group of 77" is used to describe the Third World
countries collectively. The group can be traced to the "Caucus of 75" developing countries,
which was organized prior to the 1964 United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment. Id. This group later added two members and issued a Joint Declaration of the 77
Developing Countries, and since has expanded to include more than 120 members. Id.
83 See B. BuzAN, SEABED POLITIcs 198-205 (1976). In 1970, nine Latin American States
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landlocked states joined the geographically disadvantaged states54
to form a powerful group which possessed more than one-third of
the votes in the Conference, 5 and was able to threaten with a
"blocking third" should a two-thirds vote be required on a treaty
provision e.5  As far as these groups were concerned, political and
ideological disagreements did not matter. Eastern European na-
tions, such as Poland and Czechoslovakia, were very active in the
group of landlocked and geographically disadvantaged states, even
though these states had interests different from those of the Soviet
Union.57 The Africans divided into two groups: the landlocked
states and the coastal states,58 as did, to some extent, the Europe-
claimed a 200-mile territorial sea. See Declaration of Montevideo on the Law of the Sea,
May 18, 1970, 9 I.L.M. 1081, 1082-83. Claims to a 200-mile territorial sea were first made by
Chile, Ecuador and Peru. See 1 S. LAY, R. CHURCHILL & M. NORDQUIST, NEW DIRECTIONS IN
THE LAW OF THE SEA 231-32 (1973); Evolution of the Treaty, 62 CONG. DIG. 3, 3 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as Evolution of the Treaty]. Different states had sought an expanded
territorial sea, however, for different reasons. Coastal states, such as the Democratic Peo-
ple's Republic of Korea, Romania, and the Sudan, contended that they should have the
right to safeguard their security interests. Sea Law, 19 U.N. MONTHLY CHRON. 8, 8 (1982).
Countries with large continental shelves, such as Canada, India and Indonesia, argued for
the codification of the principle of natural prolongation, which eventually was adopted with
restrictions. Wani, An Evaluation of the Convention on the Law of the Sea from the Per-
spective of the Landlocked States, 22 VA. J. INT'L L. 627, 652 n.88 (1982); see LOS Conven-
tion, supra note 37, art. 77, para. 1, at 28. See generally B. SAi HERMAN & R. ShmTHERMAN,
supra note 47, at 37-55 (analysis of the 200-mile claim in the context of Latin American
foreign policy).
Geographically disadvantaged states have a boundary on the sea but are surrounded
by the economic zones of other countries. See LOS Convention, supra note 37, art. 70, at 24.
Landlocked and shelf-locked states also have been referred to as geographically disadvan-
taged states. See R. ECKERT, supra note 6, at 44.
51 See Wani, supra note 53, at 630 n.10.
81 See Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Rules of Procedure,
U.N. Sales No. F.74.L18 (1979) (Rule 39) (two-thirds majority required to rule on substan-
tive questions). There are 30 landlocked states, including Afghanistan, Bolivia, Hungary,
Uganda and Zimbabwe. See Wani, supra note 53, at 628 & n.3. The Convention recognized
the interests of the landlocked and geographically disadvantaged states in improving their
economic status by granting them the right to participate in the exploitation of the living
resources of the exclusive economic zones of the coastal states. See LOS Convention, supra
note 37, arts. 69-70, at 24-25.
57 See B. BUZAN, supra note 53, at 201. The landlocked eastern European states have
strayed from the Soviet position on a number of proposals and allied themselves with the
Group of 77. Id. Overall, however, the unity of the landlocked states has been impaired by
the persistent adherence of the socialist states to Soviet policy. See Wani, supra note 53, at
629 n.9.
0' See B. BuzAN, supra note 53, at 215 (division between landlocked states and coastal
states necessitated compromises at 1974 Organization of African Unity (OAU) meeting).
The existence of geographically based factions within the OAU became evident in preconfer-
ence group meetings held by 19 of the developing landlocked and geographically disadvan-
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ans.5e Thus, the usual geopolitical groups became divided because
of individual economic and political interests.
The proposed change in the size of the territorial sea created
another complication. If nations were to extend their territorial
seas to 12 miles, as the general trend seemed to have been, many
international straits would cease to be part of the high seas.?° In
fact, more than 100 straits, which previously were free for naviga-
tion, would become subject to the regime of innocent passage, with
its attendant restrictions."' The major powers did not favor these
restrictions; they wanted their right to freedom of transit through
those straits to continue.6 2 Utmost patience was required on the
part of those attempting to reconcile these conflicting positions. In
trying to reach effective compromises, the members of the Confer-
ence separated the problems into groups, or packages. First, the
taged states. See id. The 19 states opposed the "extensive coastal state shelf claims that
would exclude nearly all oil areas from the common heritage." Id. The division was deep-
ened by the fact that mineral-producing landlocked states were likely to suffer economic
harm from seabed mineral production. See N. REMBE, AFRICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
OF THE SEA 75-76 (1980). The result of the growing concern was the Kampala Declaration, a
proposal by the landlocked states demanding equal rights to the resources of the zone. B.
BUZAN, supra note 53, at 216. These demands have been adopted by the Convention only
with respect to fishing. See LOS Convention, supra note 37, art. 69, at 24.
See B. BUZAN, supra note 53, at 261.
60 See K. KOH, supra note 40, at 4. The number of countries claiming 12-mile territorial
seas increased dramatically between the Second Law of the Sea Conference in 1960 and the
commencement of the Third Conference in 1973. Brown, The UN Conference on the Law of
Seas: A Progress Report, 26 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 131, 134 (1973); see also supra note 25.
6' See Sharma, Navigation Through International Straits, in LAw OF THE SEA: CARACAS
AND BEYOND 111, 113 (R. Anand ed. 1980). Extending the territorial sea to 12 miles would
bring 116 straits within the jurisdiction of coastal states. Id. Included in this total would be
many straits of international navigational significance, such as Dover, Gibraltar and
Malacca. Id.
2 See Dickey, Freedom of the Seas and the Law of the Sea: Is What's New for Better
or Worse?, 5 OCEAN D.v. & INT'L L.J. 23, 25 (1978) (United States would agree to greater
limits only if passage through vital international straits is protected); see also Moore, The
Regime of Straits and the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 74 Am.
J. INT'L L. 77, 79 (1980). The United States' concern with restricted passage through inter-
national straits has been based on the perceived detrimental effect of such restrictions on
national security. See Campbell, Navigation, in MAJOR ISSUES OF THE LAW OF THE SEA 125,
136 (D. Larson ed. 1976). This concern, along with the economic need to keep trade lanes
unrestricted, has been the primary factor in the formulation of the American and Soviet
positions. See Vitzthum, The Baltic Straits, in THE LAW OF THE SEA IN THE 1980's, at 537,
538 (C. Park ed. 1980). Canada has taken an intermediate position. See Buzan, Canada and
the Law of the Sea, 11 OCEAN DRY. & INT'L L.J. 149, 166 (1982). During the Convention
negotiations, the Canadian Government pressed for an "effective, non-obstructive regime of
passage through international straits" while at the same time arguing for exclusion of the
Northwest Passage from the scope of any rules governing passage through international
straits. Id.
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states most interested in a particular group of problems got to-
gether and tried to solve these problems. Then, the search for com-
promises was broadened, proposals of various groups were com-
bined, and a unifying solution finally was reached for many
problems put together.8
The most important package consisted of four interconnected
items: (1) a 12-mile limit to the territorial sea,6 4 thereby putting an
end to the difficulty that destroyed several previous international
conferences on the subject;65 (2) a second zone, contiguous to the
first and extending no further than 24 miles from the baseline of
the territorial sea,66 to protect states' rights in the territorial sea
and within which the coastal states would have the right to enforce
special regulations concerning customs, fiscal, immigration, and
sanitary laws;67 (3) a 200-mile exclusive economic zone, to be mea-
sured from the same baseline,' within which the coastal states
would have only limited sovereign rights with respect to fishing or
any other economic activities that might be possible there; 9 (4)
beyond the 200-mile line (and, in some circumstances, up to 350
63 See McDorman, Reservations and the Law of the Sea Treaty, 13 J. MAR. L. & COM.
481, 489-90 (1982). The attainment of compromise was facilitated by the formation in 1978
of seven negotiating groups, which were responsible for solving some of the more "hard core
areas of dispute." Id. at 489.
6See LOS Convention, supra note 37, art. 3, at 3. The Convention states that a na-
tion's territorial sea may not extend further than 12 miles from its baseline, which is the
imaginary line from which all the Convention's ocean zones are measured. Id. The location
of the territorial sea differs according to the geographical configuration of the coast, but
normally the low water mark is recognized as the baseline. Id. art. 5, at 3.
"I See Anand, Introduction to LAw OF THE SEA: CARACAS AND BEYOND 7 (R. Anand ed.
1980). The first Law of the Sea Conference was held in 1958 and produced a convention on
the territorial sea that did not address the limit of that sea. Id. at 6-7. The second Law of
the Sea Conference, held in 1960, likewise failed to produce any agreement on the territorial
limit. Id. at 7. The failure of the 1958 and 1960 conferences, however, also can be traced to
the lack of unity displayed by the third world countries. Id.; see Evriviades, supra note 52,
at 207-08. The 1930 League of Nations Codification Conference is another example of disa-
greement over the issue of the size of the territorial sea, resulting in an unsuccessful confer-
ence. Anand, supra, at 6.
66 See LOS Convention, supra note 37, art. 33, para. 2, at 11.
67 See id. art. 33, para. 1(a), at 11. Creation of the contiguous zone has been justified by
"the need to temper what would otherwise have been a rigid dichotomy between the free-
dom of the high seas and sovereignty over the territorial sea." W. EXTAVOUR, supra note 41,
at 29-30.
66 See LOS Convention, supra note 37, art. 57, at 18. The 200-mile zone extends 176
miles beyond the contiguous zone. Id.
66 See id. art. 56, para. 1(a), at 18; see also W. EXTAvOUR, supra note 41, at 187-90
(proposed rights, jurisdiction, and duties of a coastal state in the exclusive economic zone).
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miles from the baseline),70 coastal states would have jurisdiction
over the resources of the continental shelf,71 a submerged part of
the continent, containing in some areas vast oil resources, such as
those found in the Gulf of Mexico, or off the coasts of California
and Alaska. 2 Through this package of compromises, the coastal
states obtained several levels of jurisdiction over coastal waters.
The closer an area is to its shore, the broader the jurisdiction a
state has; the farther an area is from the shore, the weaker coastal
jurisdiction becomes, finally petering out somewhere around 350
miles from shore. Even at distances greater than 350 miles, coastal
jurisdiction may exist. Since the United States and the Soviet
Union were interested in some submerged plateaus near Alaska
and Siberia that extended beyond 350 miles of either shore, they
made sure that special exceptions were put into the Law of the Sea
Convention that would enable certain states to exercise some kind
of jurisdiction as far as 500 miles from shore.73 In addition to the
United States and the Soviet Union, the main beneficiaries of this
expanded jurisdiction are countries located near broad continental
shelves, such as Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, India, Indo-
nesia, and New Zealand and Norway. 4
Another part of the larger package was the problem of passage
through coastal waters. It became necessary to define innocent pas-
sage more precisely in two ways. First, it was necessary to deter-
mine what conduct is not innocent; for instance, neither military
70 See id. art. 76, paras. 1, 5, at 27.
71 See Wani, supra note 53, at 652 (states with large shelves have an interest in the
expansion of shelf jurisdiction while states with small shelves prefer to limit shelf jurisdic-
tion). A coastal state's rights in the continental shelf area are distinguishable from its rights
in the economic zone by the fact that the exercise of sovereign rights over the resources of
the continental shelf does not affect the legal status of the water or airspace above it. See
Highlights of the Treaty, 62 CONG. DIG. 6, 6 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Highlights of the
Treaty].
72 See Jackson, Offshore Petroleum Development: A Practical Perspective, in THE LAW
OF THE SEA: ISSUES IN OCEAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 226, 226 (D. Walsh ed. 1977). In fact,
most of America's prospective sources of petroleum are offshore and remain largely unex-
plored. Id. at 231; see also Anand, supra note 65, at 11 (seabed oil supply estimated to be
large enough to satisfy world consumption for 140 years).
7' See LOS Convention, supra note 37, art. 76(6), at 27; Oxman, The Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Ninth Session (1980), 75 Am. J. Ih'L L.
211, 228 n.87 (1981).
74 BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE & RESEARCH, OFFICE OF THE GEOGRAPHER, U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, INT'L BOUNDARY STUDIES, SERIES A, No. 46, Limrs IN THE SEAS: THEORETICAL AREAL
ALLOCATIONS OF SEABED TO COASTAL STATES (1972); Alexander, Indices of National Interest
in the Oceans, 1 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L.J. 21, 41 (1973).
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activity nor fishing is innocent. A list was prepared of 12 subjects
that were not considered to be innocent, including, unfortunately,
scientific research.75 Second, another list was agreed on that estab-
lished the eight subjects about which coastal states may make reg-
ulations.7e For instance, they may regulate pollution, the safety of
navigation, and a few other matters, but they may not regulate the
design, construction, or manning of foreign ships.7 7 Another ques-
tion to be decided was how submarines should be treated. This is-
sue finally was resolved by deciding that submarines are entitled to
innocent passage through the territorial sea provided they exercise
this right on the surface; they may not pass under water. 78 There
also was continuous debate at virtually every session as to whether
a military vessel might travel through the territorial sea of another
coastal state without giving prior notification to, and obtaining
permission from, that coastal state. There is no provision in the
Convention on this issue because the various delegations could not
agree on one. 9 At present, various countries continue to have dif-
ferent rules on the subject, and some may in fact be in the process
of changing their positions.80 For instance, the Soviet Union previ-
ously was very strongly opposed to the idea of foreign military ves-
75 LOS Convention, supra note 37, art. 19, at 6-7.
70 See id. art. 21, para. 1, at 7.
77 See id. art. 21, para. 2, at 7. By the terms of the Convention, polluters of the sea will
be liable for the damage that they cause to nations possessing jurisdiction over the polluted
areas. See id. art. 235, at 84. Such damage may originate either on land or at sea, and the
offending nation is responsible whether the pollution-producing entity is public or private.
See id. art. 194, at 1308; id. art. 235, at 1315; Note, Ixtoc I: International and Domestic
Remedies for Transboundary Pollution Injury, 49 FORDHAm L. Rav. 404, 412-13 (1980).
78 See LOS Convention, supra note 37, art. 20, at 7. In addition to the requirement that
submarines navigate on the surface, the Convention provides that they also must show their
flags while navigating territorial seas. Id.
70 See Neutze, Whose Law of Whose Sea?, [1983] U.S. NAvAL INST. PRoc. 43, 45-46
(discussing events leading to withdrawal of proposed amendments concerning right to inno-
cent passage for military vessels).
8o Support for granting innocent passage to military vessels, at least under specified
conditions, appears to be growing, though many nations still deny this right. See Pirtle,
Transit Rights and U.S. Security Interests in International Straits: The "Straits Debate"
Revisited, 5 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L.J. 477, 481-82 (1978). China, for instance, steadfastly
adheres to the proposition that warships have no right of innocent passage, and has declared
that a coastal state may require military ships of foreign states to tender prior notification
to the coastal state's government before navigating its territorial sea. See Comment, The
Innocent Passage of Warships in Foreign Territorial Seas: A Threatened Freedom, 15 SAN
DIEGo L. REV. 573, 600 (1978). The Convention gives the coastal state the right to ask war-
ships to leave its territorial waters if the vessel violates a regulation of the state, and the
nation under whose flag the vessel sails is held responsible for damage resulting from such
noncompliance. See LOS Convention, supra note 37, arts. 30-31, at 10.
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sels entering its territorial waters; but now that it is becoming a
major maritime power, it is likely to become more lenient on the
subject."'
All these compromises were necessary to settle just one
point-the regime of the territorial sea. Once agreement was
reached on that issue, another dispute started regarding the con-
tiguous zone. This dispute focused primarily on two issues:
whether a separate contiguous zone is needed, and, if so, whether
the zone should extend only 24 miles or 200 miles. The latter pro-
posal was the one the major powers rejected, preferring to limit the
zone to 24 miles. This rule was accepted, thanks to support from
countries that did not want to be concerned with having to police a
larger area.
2
The problem of straits and archipelagoes was solved by estab-
lishing a freedom of transit passage, which was broader than the
right of innocent passage in the sense that certain activities that
were not permitted in innocent passage through ordinary territo-
rial seas are permitted in passage through straits.83 For instance,
submarines may travel under water through straits and airplanes
may fly overhead without the permission of the coastal states.8 4
This issue was very important to the United States for strategic
reasons. During the Israeli-Egyptian crisis in 1973, the United
States suddenly discovered that, because of an agreement between
Morocco and Spain, it was not permitted to fly aid to Israel over
81 See Comment, supra note 80, at 600. The present Soviet position, however, is to
permit innocent passage of military vessels only if the Government receives notice within 30
days or more of the intended passage. See Pirtle, supra note 80, at 495 n.17.
81 See LOS Convention, supra note 37, art. 33, para. 2, at 11.
8-1 The major difference between the right of innocent passage and the right of transit
passage is that while the coastal state may block passage that is not innocent and may
interrupt innocent passage for security purposes under the innocent passage regime, neither
of these acts is permissible under the transit passage regime. Maduro, Passage Through
International Straits: The Prospects Emerging From the Third United Nations Confer-
ence on the Law of the Sea, 12 J. MAR. L. & COM. 65, 82 (1980). The regulatory power of the
coastal state also is more restricted in a strait than in the territorial sea. Compare LOS
Convention, supra note 37, art. 21, at 7 (innocent passage) with id. art. 42, at 13-14 (transit
passage).
8 See LOS Convention, supra note 37, art. 38, at 12. Article 39(1)(c) refers to the "nor-
mal modes of continuous and expeditious transit." Id. art. 39, para. 1(c), at 12. For subma-
rines, the normal mode of transit is under water. Cf. id. art. 20, at 7. Article 53(3) speaks of
"rights of navigation and overflight in the normal mode" when referring to archipelagic pas-
sage. Id. art. 53, para. 3, at 17. Of course, aircraft and ships exercising transit rights still
must comply with international rules and regulations, see id. art. 39, paras. 2-3, at 12-13, as
well as with the schemes concerning sea lanes and traffic separation schemes promulgated
by the states that border the straits, see id. art. 41, para. 7, at 13.
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the Straits of Gibraltar. France would not permit American flight
through its airspace either, so the American planes had to fly a
roundabout route across the Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland
(slightly violating its neutrality), Italy, and then into the Mediter-
ranean-a much more complicated path.8 5 Thereafter, one of the
points the United States Air Force insisted on, of course, was that
there must be a right of passage through the straits for airplanes.
The Convention's rules on the freedom of passage permit this. 6 A
similar, though slightly more restrictive, rule was established for
archipelagic passage. Foreign ships and airplanes were guaranteed
the right of archipelagic sea lane passage through all archipelagic
straits necessary for international navigation. 7 This right is more
limited, because foreign ships are confined to special corridors that
the archipelagic states may establish; but apart from that, the pas-
sage rules applied are very much like the ones for ordinary
straits.88 Incidentally, the Conference also was able to solve an-
other archipelagic problem, the problem of archipelagic waters, 9
by finally devising a definition of "archipelago" that would include
the major archipelagoes such as Indonesia, the Philippines, the Ba-
" See Quandt, The Western Alliance in the Middle East: Problems for US Foreign
Policy, in THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE WESTERN ALLIANCE 9, 10-11 (S. Spiegal ed. 1982);
Sankari, Western Europe: From Belligerency to Neutrality, in MIDDLE EAST CRUCIBLE:
STUDIES ON THE AR -IsRAELI WAR OF OCTOBER 1973, at 265, 267 (N. Aruri ed. 1975); Stein,
Alice in Wonderland: The North Atlantic Alliance and the Arab-Israeli Dispute, in THE
MIDDLE EAST AND THE WESTERN ALLIANCE 49, 55 (S. Spiegal ed. 1982).
"6 LOS Convention, supra note 37, art. 38, para. 1, at 12. For a general discussion of the
regime of straits, see Moore, supra note 62, at 77, and Reisman, The Regime of Straits and
National Security: An Appraisal of International Lawmaking, 74 Am. J. INT'L L. 48, 65-67
(1980).
81 See LOS Convention, supra note 37, art. 53, at 17. In archipelagic waters, which are
not necessary to international navigation, ships of all states have the right of innocent pas-
sage, but an archipelagic state may, if necessary, temporarily suspend the passage of foreign
ships if national security reasons necessitate such an act. Id. art. 52, para. 2, at 16-17.
88 Id. art. 54, at 18 (indicating that articles 39, 40, 42, and 44 apply to archipelagic sea
lane passage).
19 Archipelagic waters lie within the baselines drawn from the outermost points and the
drying reefs of the outermost islands of an archipelago. See LOS Convention, supra note 37,
art. 47, at 15. The question of whether archipelagic states should be treated differently for
the purpose of determining territorial waters was left unresolved by the First and Second
Conferences on the Law of the Sea. The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea ultimately solved the problem by establishing a system of archipelagic baselines,
with predetermined maximum lengths of 100 and 125 miles, and special ratios of water areas
to land areas. See id. art. 47 (1), (2) (ratios between 1 to 1 and 9 to 1). The Convention text
may be traced to the proposed Indonesian plan of embracing the entire body of water lying
between the islands of the archipelago, instead of measuring the territorial distance from
each individual island. See R. ECKERT, supra note 6, at 28.
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hamas, and even Fiji, but would not include other groups of
smaller islands, or such larger islands as New Zealand and Great
Britain, which theoretically also have some archipelagoes associ-
ated with them. 0 In order to obtain acceptance for the new rule, it
had to be limited to archipelagic states, or states composed only of
islands; thus it does not extend to states, such as Greece, that are
half mainland and half island.91
Next, there were difficulties with respect to the exclusive eco-
nomic zone. On the one hand, it was realized from the very begin-
ning that the coastal states must be given fishing rights up to 200
miles from the coastline; but, on the other hand, the United States
had opposed this for a long time because of its distant fish-
ing-especially its tuna fishing off the coasts of Ecuador and Peru
and its shrimp fishing off the coast of Brazil.9 2 In view of the in-
crease in the number of foreign vessels fishing off the coasts of the
United States, however, fishermen on the Atlantic coast, in the Pa-
cific Northwest, and in Alaska shifted their position. Under their
pressure, the United States adopted a 200-mile fishing zone.93
Thereafter, it was no longer possible for it to oppose such an eco-
nomic zone for other countries. As a result, a 200-mile exclusive
economic zone for coastal states has been established, which is of
great importance to the economies of many coastal countries. 4
Of course, there was a fear that the establishment of such
broad economic zones would impinge upon freedom of naviga-
tion.9 5 Past experience had always been that if a state extended its
9. See supra note 89; see also LOS Convention, supra note 37, art. 46 para. (a), (b), at
15 (defining "archipelagic State" and "archipelago").
91 See LOS Convention, supra note 37, art. 46(a), at 15. See generally B. DuBNER, THE
LAW OF TERRITORIAL WATERS OF MID-OCEAN ARCHIPELAGOS AND ARCHIPELAGIC STATES 18-26
(1976) (distinguishing coastal archipelagos from mid-ocean archipelagos); Amerasinghe, The
Problem of Archipelagos in the International Law of the Sea, 23 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 539,
566-75 (1974) (proposing special regime for archipelagos); O'Connell, Mid-Ocean Archipela-
gos in International Law, [1972] BRrr. Y.B. INrr'L L. 1, 1-22 (history of treatment of archi-
pelagos in international law).
9' See Hollick, The Roots of U.S. Fisheries Policy, 5 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L.J. 61, 66
(1978).
" See Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-265, § 101,
90 Stat. 331, 336 (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1811 (1982)); see also L. JUDA, supra note
42, at 71-72 (discussing decline of American fishing industry and movement for legislative
action). Coastal fishing interests in the Atlantic off Canada also were vocal in their support
of the 200-mile zone. Snow, Extended Fishery Jurisdiction in Canada and the United
States, 5 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L.J. 291, 293 (1978).
" See LOS Convention, supra note 37, art. 57, at 1280.
95 See Snow, supra note 93, at 293.
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coastal jurisdiction with respect to subject "A," its jurisdiction was
slowly broadened to embrace subjects "B," "C," and "D," as well;
eventually the whole range of subjects came under that coastal
state's jurisdiction. Therefore, the major powers refused to accept
an exclusive economic zone unless the coastal states agreed to
strict limits on their jurisdiction. Consequently, the powers of the
coastal states are clearly enumerated in the Convention and are
restricted to the exploitation, conservation, and management of
the living and non-living resources of the zone. At the same time,
the basic freedoms of the sea, especially freedom of navigation, are
carefully safeguarded."8
Only three exceptions to this rule of limited jurisdiction were
agreed upon. First, coastal states were granted extensive discre-
tionary rights over fishing within the zone, subject to a few minor
restrictions.9 7 Second, it was generally recognized that coastal
states need to be allowed to protect the coastal zone from pollu-
tion, especially by oil, because so many disasters of this kind occur.
Therefore, special rules were developed for the protection of the
marine environment.9 8 Again, a compromise was reached in that
the rules to be applied in the economic zone by the coastal states
must be generally accepted by the international community,
though once they are accepted, the coastal states have the primary
power to enforce them in their coastal areas.99 So the difference
between the legislative power and the enforcement power was used
here to divide jurisdiction along functional lines.
The third problem was scientific research. Here again, the
Conference divided the subject along functional lines. Certain cate-
gories of research, such as those conducted by international insti-
tutions or by regional bodies, would be permitted with few restric-
96 Compare LOS Convention, supra note 37, art. 56, at 18 (rights and duties of coastal
state in its own economic zone) with id. art. 58, at 19 (rights and duties of other states in
coastal state's economic zone). For a discussion of the protection afforded the right to free
navigation in the exclusive economic zone, see W. EXTAVOUR, supra note 41, at 233-43.
'7 See LOS Convention, supra note 37, arts. 61-62, at 20-22; see also id. arts. 63-68, at
22-23 (regulations pertaining to particular categories of species). The primary fishing rights
granted to the coastal state by the Convention were: the right to establish a maximum al-
lowable catch of a particular species in its waters, the right to reserve to itself all the fish
that its fishermen can catch, and the right to determine how the remainder shall be divided
among the fishermen of other states. Id. arts. 61-62, at 20-22.
98 See id. art. 220, at 79-80 (providing for right of coastal state to enforce its anti-
pollution measures); see also id. art. 56, para. 1(b)(iii), at 18 (granting coastal state jurisdic-
tion to preserve and protect "the marine environment").
Il See id. arts. 211, 220, at 75, 79-80.
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tions.l00 On the other hand, some categories of research by national
bodies would be subject to greater control, while other categories of
research, such as research about natural resources, would be pro-
hibited in the economic zone unless the coastal state expressly per-
mitted it.l" Consequently, theoretical marine research will remain
quite free under the Convention, but practical marine research will
be more firmly under the control of the coastal state.
Another jurisdictional issue was presented by the existence of
the continental shelf. In 1958, when the international community
first faced the problem of deciding who should be permitted to ex-
ploit the shelf, a rather simplified solution was adopted. The
coastal states were declared to be entitled to the resources of the
continental shelf to an average depth of about 200 meters (100
fathoms).102 At the same time, however, it was agreed that, should
developments in technology enable a state to exploit the shelf fur-
ther, it could go further. 10 3 Unfortunately, technology developed
faster than expected and very quickly technology for exploiting the
continental shelf to the deepest depths of the ocean became availa-
ble. It thus became possible for all the coastal states to extend
their jurisdiction to the middle of the ocean and put an end to the
freedom of the seas.104 To prevent that, many nations argued that
100 See id. art. 247, at 87-88; see also id. art. 252, at 89-90 (implied consent may be
found if, 4 months subsequent to notice to coastal state, coastal state has not withheld con-
sent). One commentator has explained that the Convention prohibits the coastal state from
restricting scientific research in its economic zone if the research is to be conducted for
peaceful purposes and for the benefit of all mankind, provided it does not interfere with the
coastal state's right to the area. See P. RAO, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF OCEAN REsouRCEs 130-31
(1975); see also LOS Convention, supra note 37, art. 246, para. 3, at 87.
101 See LOS Convention, supra note 37, art. 246, at 87-88. Article 246 stipulates circum-
stances under which it would be reasonable for a coastal state to withhold its consent to
scientific research. Id. Paragraph 5, for instance, provides that a coastal state may withhold
consent to scientific research if that research:
(a) is of a direct significance [to] the exploration and exploitation of natural re-
sources, whether living or non-living; [or] (b) involves drilling into the continental
shelf, the use of explosives or the introduction of harmful substances into the
marin6 environment ....
Id. art. 246, para. 5(a), (b), at 87.
1'2 See Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 18, arts. 1-2, 15 U.S.T. at 473,
T.I.A.S. No. 5578, at 3, 499 U.N.T.S. at 312-14; Goldie, Delimiting Continental Shelf
Boundaries, in LIMrrS TO NATIONAL JURISDICTION OVER THE SEA 1, 30-31 (G. Yates ed. 1974).
los See Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 18, art. 1, 15 U.S.T. at 473, T.I.A.S.
No. 5578, at 3, 499 U.N.T.S. at 312. When a state has exceeded present technological limits,
it may extend its jurisdiction beyond the 200-meter limit "to where the depth of the super-
jacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources." Id.
104 Commentators have expressed concern that continued encroachment on the high
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no state could be allowed to go that far, and that a coastal state's
jurisdiction over the continental shelf had to be limited somehow
to "adjacent" areas. The Conference had to resolve a battle over
that issue between the states with a large continental shelf, such as
Argentina and Australia, and those with a smaller shelf or with no
shelf.105 Argentina and Australia were the leaders in this battle,
though Canada, the United States, and the Soviet Union were not
far behind; but some of the developing countries, especially Indo-
nesia and India, also favored the approach that would extend their
jurisdiction. 10 6 Ultimately, a compromise was reached. It was
agreed that, normally, every state would be entitled to continental
shelf-type jurisdiction up to 200 miles from the baseline, whether
it really possessed a shelf or not.107 Where there is a true continen-
tal "margin," however, reaching beyond 200 miles-and the Con-
vention defines the margin as including not only the normal shelf
that descends gently into the sea, but also the slope that goes down
more steeply, and even the rise that often extends still another 100
miles, so that altogether some margins may extend 350 miles from
shore s-the coastal states have limited jurisdiction over the living
and nonliving economic resources of the "shelf."10 9 These include
mainly oil and natural gas, as well as possibly some manganese
nodules or other mineral resources, and in addition embrace some
coastal species of marine life, such as oysters, clams, and certain
types of lobsters.110 Some new mineral resources that have been
seas by coastal state jurisdictional claims could reduce those seas to a series of "interna-
tional lakes." See, e.g., L. HENKIN, LAW FOR THE SEA'S MINERAL RESOURCES 17-19, 60-62
(1968); Goldie, The Exploitability Test-Interpretation and Potentialities, 8 NAT. RE-
SOURCES J. 434, 439-40 (1968). Technological advances made subsequent to the 1958 Con-
vention have tended to permit the exploitability test to undermine the 200-meter rule limi-
tation rather than to supplement it as originally intended. See id. at 437-38. Thus, some
commentators have contended that the test should be eliminated. E.g., P. RAO, supra note
100, at 19-20.
101 Cf. P. RAO, supra note 100, at 68-70 (dispute at 1974 Caracas conference).
106 See generally id. at 68-72 (discussing debate concerning rights of disadvantaged
states).
'10 See LOS Convention, supra note 37, art. 76, para. 1, at 27. Chile actually has no
shelf, P. RAo, supra note 100, at 51, but under article 76 it will have continental shelf juris-
diction for up to 200 miles from its baseline.
108 See LOS Convention, supra note 37, art. 76, paras. 3-6, at 27; see also Buzan &
Middlemiss, Canadian Foreign Policy and the Exploitation of the Seabed, in CANADIAN
FOREIGN POLICY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 1, 2 (1977) (diagram illustrating configuration of
continental margin).
"19 See LOS Convention, supra note 37, art. 77, at 28. The waters over the continental
shelf retain their status as high seas. See id. art. 78, at 28.
110 See id. art. 77, para. 4, at 1285. Since only "organisms which, at the harvestable
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recently discovered within the 200-mile zone and on the continen-
tal shelf thus will be subject to coastal state jurisdiction.'1 ' To
make these extensions of coastal jurisdiction acceptable to land-
locked countries, it was agreed that the international community
would get a small share, a small percentage of revenue from any
mineral resources found beyond the 200-mile limit, to be put into a
common international fund.112 While the United States has been
rather reluctant to accept this particular feature of the Conven-
tion, it is part of the compromise that was generally accepted.
This was the content of various packages as accepted by gen-
eral consensus two years ago. When the Reagan Administration
came into power in 1981, it discovered that it fundamentally dis-
agreed with the Convention's position concerning deep seabed
mining beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. From the very
beginning, the United Nations has said that the seabed has not
been and cannot be regulated by any country, and that it therefore
would be proper to regulate it through the special international au-
thority on the subject-the United Nations Sea-Bed Mining Au-
thority."' That authority would ensure that the deep seabed would
be accessible to all states on equitable terms. A large part of the
negotiations over the last 15 years has been on that subject: how
that authority should be established; what rules of decisionmaking
should it use; what provisions should there be about the granting
of applications for mining licenses presented by states; what rules
would be applicable to mining activities; and to what extent the
resources should be divided between the major powers, on the one
stage, either are immobile... or are unable to move except in constant physical contact
with the sea-bed," are part of the seabed resources covered by the Convention, see id. art.
77, para. 4, at 28, there has been considerable debate as to whether lobsters are included,
see, e.g., Note, The Dispute Between France and Brazil over Lobster Fishing in the Atlan-
tic, 13 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 1453, 1454-55 (1964).
See 1 Strategic Materials Management, No. 13, Nov. 1, 1981, at 3 (poly-
metallic sulfides).
112 See LOS Convention, supra note 37, art. 82, at 29. The coastal state is permitted a
5-year grace period in order to recover its original investment. See id.
"' See Adede, The Group of 77 and the Establishment of the International Sea-Bed
Authority, 7 OcEA DEv. & INT'L L.J. 31, 37 (1979) (discussing development of concept of a
Sea-Bed Authority). The Sea-Bed Authority will consist of five principal organs: the Assem-
bly, the Council, the Enterprise, the Tribunal, and the Secretariat. See id. For a discussion
of the powers and functions of these organs, see id. at 38-43. The Authority is considered by
some commentators to be unique in that it will not be limited to drafting rules and regula-
tions governing seabed exploitation, but actually will be involved in the business of seabed
exploitation. See id. at 59; see also LOS Convention, supra note 37, arts. 157-70, at 52-64
(powers, functions, procedures and composition of Sea-Bed Authority).
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hand, and the developing countries, on the other. In regard to this
last matter, a half-and-half idea was once proposed by Henry Kis-
singer, the United States Secretary of State at that time, and was
accepted reluctantly by the other nations. Under this plan, the ma-
jor powers would get half of the prime seabed mining sites and the
other countries would get half, each group exploiting its half pur-
suant to a different set of rules.114 But when the Reagan Adminis-
tration came in, it decided that all these compromises on various
subjects relating to deep seabed mining were not acceptable." Va-
rious ideological grounds were given for rejecting the compromise
text. The new Administration did not like the idea of transfer of
technology; it did not like the idea of limits on production; indeed,
it did not like the idea of international regulation in the first place.
One member of the Administration pointed out that since it was
trying to abolish regulation of industry domestically, it could not
be expected to accept international regulation of industry at the
same time. After studying the question for more than a year, the
Administration finally announced that it did not want this part of
the treaty at all.1 '
The Reagan Administration hoped that once the United
States refused to accept the treaty, the whole enterprise would col-
lapse. However, this is not what happened. Though the United
States voted against the Convention, it was adopted by 130 votes,
with only four votes against and a few abstentions,m most of
which were made by Soviet bloc countries, because their leaders
felt that the United States got a better deal than they did under
114 See Secretary of State Kissinger, Address Before the Foreign Policy Ass'n in New
York City (Apr. 8, 1976), reprinted in 74 DEP'T ST. BULL. 533, 540 (1976). Secretary Kis-
singer advocated that when a contractor-who presumably would be from a developed coun-
try-desires to mine the seabed, it should be required to propose two potential sites to the
Sea-Bed Resource Authority, which would then select one site to be mined by the Enter-
prise, an arm of the Authority, or made available for present or future exploitation by a
developing nation and would permit the contractor to mine the other. See id.
115 See Shingleton, UNCLOS III and the Struggle for Law: The Elusive Customary
Law of Seabed Mining, 13 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L.J. 33, 36 (1983); Recer, The Struggle for
the Bottom of the Sea, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., March 15, 1982, at 69, 69-70; A Big Snag
for Seabed Mining, Bus. WK., March 16, 1981, at 29, 29-30.
"' See Statements by President Reagan and Ambassador Malone before House Foreign
Affairs Comm. (July 9 & August 12, 1982), reprinted in BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFARmS, U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, LAW OF THE SEA AND OCEANS POLICY, CURRENT POLICY No. 416, at 1-4 [here-
inafter cited as OCEANS POLICY]. President Reagan's decision to reject the treaty reversed
several years of negotiations under the Ford and Carter Administrations. See 23 HARv. INT'L
L.J. 455, 463 n.61 (1983).
117 U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/SR.182, at 10 (1982).
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its provisions. Then, the Administration assumed that the treaty
would not be signed. Unfortunately, it was wrong a second time.
Most countries did sign the Convention; by now more than 130
states have actually signed it."' Of course, now the Administration
contends that the signatories will not ratify the Convention. For
the moment, only 9 have ratified-mostly the small countries, such
as the Bahamas, Belize, Fiji, Ghana, Jamaica, Zambia and
Namibia, but also Mexico and Egypt, the first of the larger coun-
tries to do so.119 There is now a Preparatory Commission on the
subject of seabed mining working in Jamaica, the headquarters of
the seabed mining authority. 120
There is one more topic that needs to be mentioned---dispute
settlement. In international law, all states are sovereign, all states
are equal. These principles also apply to the interpretation of in-
ternational agreements. For instance, interpretations of a treaty
given by the United States, on the one hand, and Cuba, on the
other hand, are of equal value. Neither country can impose its in-
terpretation by force on the other one any longer-the Charter of
the United Nations clearly prohibits it. 2' Therefore, the only way
to settle a dispute is by peaceful means, such as negotiation. If ne-
gotiation does not work, the parties often refer the matter to some
third party for mediation or conciliation. If that does not result in
a settlement, the parties may turn to arbitration or to the interna-
tional court as a last resort.
When the United States delegation came to these negotiations,
it was quite obvious that the treaty was going to be very long, very
complicated, and also that many of the provisions would be the
result of compromises-and it is the very nature of a compromise
that problems are solved by drawing up an ambiguous text, so that
everyone can have his own interpretation of what was agreed upon.
It was generally accepted that the Law of the Sea Treaty would
not work unless an effective system for settling disputes was in-
cluded in it.'22 But many thought that it was crazy to believe that
118 As of September 15, 1983, 131 governments had signed the Convention. LAw OF THE
SEA BuLL., Sept. 1983, at 6, 10 (table).
119 U.N. Press Release, SEAI519 (1983); LAw OF THE SEA BuLL., supra note 118, at 10
(table). The most recent additions to the list of ratifying nations are Belize and Egypt. LAw
OF THE SEA BULL., supra note 118, at 6, 7.
120 U.N. Press Release, SEA/519 (1983).
121 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. Although the Charter forbids the use of force, certain
types of economic pressure are sometimes permitted.
" See Adede, Law of the Sea-The Integration of the System of Settlement of Dis-
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such a system could be devised. It was, after all, common knowl-
edge that the Soviet Union had never accepted such a system,123
and that the new countries did not like the international court.124
How could anyone conceive of a system that would be accepted by
everyone? As has often happened to me in the past, my colleagues
observed that this was an impossible task, then threw it at me and
asked me to negotiate it. To the surprise of most experts, we got a
system after many years of hard work.125 It is not perfect and it is
very complicated; but the miracle of it was that the Soviet Union
was persuaded to participate in it. In fact by now, the Soviet
Union likes it so much that it was the first nation to make a decla-
ration officially accepting it at the final meeting in Jamaica.126 The
African states, which also opposed the system very strongly at the
beginning, became convinced it was a good idea once the type of
forum they preferred was instituted, namely, a special interna-
tional tribunal.127 It became clear during the negotiations that it
would not be possible to have a system in which one forum would
putes under the Draft Convention as a Whole, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 84, 84 (1978). In light of
the nature of the compromises involved, there is a need for "an effective and comprehensive
system. . . for the peaceful settlement of disputes which may arise from the interpretation
and application of the Convention." Id. As Ambassador Stevenson has noted, "a system is
needed that insures, to the maximum possible extent, uniform interpretation and immediate
access to dispute-settlement machinery in urgent situations while at the same time preserv-
ing the flexibility of states to agree to resolve their disputes by a variety of means." State-
ment by Ambassador Stevenson, Main Committee (August 22, 1973), reprinted in 69 DEP'T
ST. BULL. 412, 414 (1973).
M See Darwin, General Introduction to INTERNATIONAL DIspuTEs: THE LEGAL ASPECTS
57, 68-69 (1972). The Soviet Union places great emphasis on non-binding negotiation as a
method for settling disputes, and argues that binding methods of dispute settlement should
be accepted by states voluntarily. Id.
124 The developing states are wary of the International Court of Justice and of judicial
settlement of international disputes in general. See id. at 66-67. Part of the reason for this is
their belief that their interests would be prejudiced by the application of traditional princi-
ples of international law. See id. at 67. In particular, these states are unwilling to be held to
standards of law developed prior to their involvement in the international community. Id.
125 For a more detailed description of the negotiations that led to the dispute settle-
ment system embodied in the Law of the Sea Convention, see Sohn, Peaceful Settlement of
Disputes in Ocean Conflicts: Does UNCLOS III Point the Way?, 46 LAW & CoNTEmp.
PROBS. 195, 196-200 (1983).
128 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/PV.191, at 38 (1982).
127 A logical basis for the initial adverse reaction of the African States to the Interna-
tional Court can be found in the court's failure to hold that the African applicants had a
legal interest in the matters at issue in the South West Africa cases. See South Africa,
(Ethiopia v. S. Afr.; Liberia v. S. Afr.), 1962 I.C.J. 319, 328 (judgment of Dec. 21); Darwin,
supra note 123, at 68. The African States consequently considered themselves to be inade-
quately represented in the court. Id. at 67.
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handle all disputes. So the Conference members developed the
idea that there should be a smorgasbord, a buffet table of forums
at which the countries could choose from the International Court
of Justice at the Hague,128 a special Law of the Sea Tribunal,129
ordinary arbitration,130 or what the Russians call technical arbitra-
tion (an arbitral tribunal composed of both lawyers and experts on
the disputed subject).131 Each of the states, when joining the
treaty, is free to declare which one of these four systems for set-
tling disputes it prefers.132 If two states involved in a dispute have
128 See generally Allott, The International Court of Justice, in INTERNATIONAL Dis-
PuTEs: THE LEGAL ASPECTS 128, 128-34 (1972) (discussing role of international adjudication).
The International Court of Justice serves as the official judicial tribunal of the United Na-
tions. See U.N. CHARTER art. 92; Statute of the International Court of Justice, 59 Stat. 1055
(1945). The court is composed of 15 judges, no two of whom may be from the same nation.
Each judge must either qualify for appointment to the highest judicial position in his or her
respective country, or must be a recognized expert on international law. Statute of the
Court, annexed to U.N. CHARTER, arts. 2-3. The court was founded to resolve disputes be-
tween states, regardless of their membership in the United Nations. See S. ROSENNE, THE
WORLD COURT, WHAT rr is AND How rr WORKS 74-75 (1962).
129 See LOS Convention, supra note 37, annex 6, art. 1, at 140. The International Tri-
bunal for the Law of the Sea is composed of 21 independent members and provides for
representation according to equitable geographical distribution. Id. annex 6, art. 2, at 141. A
Sea-Bed Dispute Chamber was established with broad jurisdiction over disputes not only
between states, but also between the Sea-Bed Authority and a state, and between the Au-
thority and a state enterprise or a natural or juridical person who is a contractor or a pro-
spective contractor. Id. art. 187, at 68. The Chamber also has the authority to render advi-
sory opinions at the request of the Assembly or the Council of the Authority. Id. art. 191, at
69.
110 See LOS Convention, supra note 37, annex 7, art. 1, at 149. Arbitration allows for
dispute resolution by judges chosen by the states involved or, in cases of disagreement, by
the President of the Law of the Sea Tribunal. Id. annex 7, art. 3, at 150; see Fox, Arbitra-
tion, in INTERNATIONAL DispuTEs: THE LEGAL AsPECTS 101, 101 (1972). In order to submit a
dispute to an arbitral proceeding under the Convention, written notice containing a state-
ment of the claim and the grounds on which it is based must be given to the opposing party.
LOS Convention, supra note 37, annex 7, art. 1, at 149. Once the tribunal is convened, it
determines its internal procedure, unless the parties to the dispute agree otherwise. Id. an-
nex 7, art. 5, at 151.
131 Special arbitral tribunals are available to resolve disputes "concerning the interpre-
tation or application of the articles of this Convention relating to (1) fisheries, (2) protection
and preservation of the marine environment, (3) marine scientific research, or (4) naviga-
tion." LOS Convention, supra note 37, annex 8, art. 1, at 152. A list of experts in each field
is to be maintained by the United Nations specialized agency in charge of matters relating
to that field, and each state may select two experts in each field for inclusion on the list. Id.
annex 8, art. 2, at 152-53. As a Soviet delegate observed, lawyers are not well informed
concerning fish, except to eat it; similarly, lawyers know little about deep seabed mining or
other relevant issues. Therefore, a tribunal that has both lawyers and technical experts is
needed to resolve disputes in these areas.
12 Id. art. 287, para. 1, at 98.
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accepted the same one, it applies."' 3 If they did not accept the
same one, then it was generally agreed that the second choice
would be ordinary arbitration, and that arbitration must be used if
there is a disagreement or if a state has not made a choice. 3 4 To
ensure that a state will not be able to escape its obligation to arbi-
trate, a tight system of arbitration was provided for in an annex to
the treaty.13 5
There were many other problems. Most of the treaty, perhaps
90% of it, is subject to binding arbitration or another one of the
binding decision systems. 136 But conciliation had to be provided as
an alternative to binding arbitration because of the unwillingness
of the coastal states to accept another method of dispute settle-
ment for certain conflicts.1 37 With respect to certain questions re-
lating to the coastal states' jurisdiction in the new exclusive eco-
nomic zone (for instance, some fishing issues), these states had
reluctantly agreed to conciliation; but with respect to issues subject
to their discretion, they had rejected international control com-
pletely.1 38 The same was true with respect to some issues concern-
ing scientific research.1 39 The issue of boundaries in the sea be-
tween states also caused a big debate. 4 0 It was agreed finally that
"I Id. art. 287, para. 4, at 99.
134 Id. art. 287, paras. 3, 5, at 99.
133 See id. annex 7, art. 9, at 151; supra note 130.
130 See id. arts. 279, 285, 286, at 97-98 (disputes concerning application or interpreta-
tion of Convention should be settled peacefully either by negotiation, conciliation, or pursu-
ant to part XI of the Convention). In the common instance where the parties to a dispute
are unable to reconcile their differences by resort to negotiation or conciliation, the treaty
provides that, at the request of any party, the dispute will be submitted to a compulsory
and legally binding dispute resolution procedure. See id. arts. 286, 296, at 98, 101. Although
the rule is subject to exceptions, see infra note 137, the majority of conflicts are resolved in
this manner, Ball, Law of the Sea: Expression of Solidarity, 19 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 461, 471
(1982).
137 See, e.g., Highlights of the Treaty, supra note 71, at 32 (disputes involving scientific
research); Ball, supra note 136, at 470-71 (disputes involving scientific research and fishing).
Though conciliation invitations generally need not be accepted, the Convention provides for
compulsory submission of certain enumerated controversies to conciliation procedures. LOS
Convention, supra note 37, annex 5, art. 11, at 140; id. arts. 297-299, at 101-04. Any party to
a dispute involving the exercise of a coastal state's sovereign rights or jurisdiction with re-
spect to certain aspects of marine scientific research, fisheries management, or some catego-
ries of sea boundary delimitations shall, upon the written request of an opposing party, be
obligated to submit to conciliation proceedings. Id. arts. 297, 298, at 101-04.
I" See id. art. 297, para. 3, at 102-03.
19 See id. art. 297, para. 2, at 102.
140 See Adede, The Basic Structure of the Disputes Settlement Part of the Law of the
Sea Convention, 11 OCEAN D.v. & INT'L L.J. 125, 137-39 (1982). In order to satisfy both
those who favored subjecting sea boundary disputes to compulsory, binding procedures and
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all the sea boundary disputes that had arisen prior to the coming
into force of the new treaty would not be subject to the new meth-
ods of settlement, but that all disputes arising subsequently would
at least be subject to conciliation.141
Despite all these complications, most experts agree that one of
the great achievements of the Law of the Sea Conference was that
it established a very strict method of dispute settlement for most
disputes that might arise as to the interpretation and application
of the Convention.
CONCLUSION
By the time the Conference ended, the nations of the world
had agreed on a treaty solving most of the problems of the law of
the sea, both by a detailed text and by binding provisions for dis-
pute settlement. The only problem still unresolved is the problem
of deep seabed mining. The Reagan Administration has said that it
is not going to ratify the treaty; it does not want to have any part
of it, and it refuses to participate in the Preparatory Commission
sitting in Jamaica. 142 At the same time, in a recent proclamation on
those who believed that binding dispute resolution would be inappropriate for those types of
problems, the Convention placed boundary disputes in a category designated as optional
exceptions to section 2. LOS Convention, supra note 37, art. 298, at 103-04. If a state opts
out of section 2 obligations with respect to boundary disputes, it may resort to the binding
provisions of section 2 against another state with which it has a boundary dispute only by
agreement with that state. Id. art. 298, para. 3, at 104.
Section 2 also may be invoked in cases where the parties refuse to accept a report of the
conciliation commission. Id. art. 298, para. 1, at 103. Article 298 provides that if, after a
conciliation commission has presented its report to the parties, the parties fail to act in
accordance with its findings, the dispute is to be submitted by mutual consent to one of the
binding procedures of section 2. Id. There is an obligation to negotiate in good faith con-
cerning an agreement for such submission, but there is no obligation to agree on the terms
of such an agreement. See id. art. 300, at 104.
141 See LOS Convention, supra note 37, art. 298, para. 1(a)(i), at 103. Section 1 of part
15 of the treaty, see id. arts. 279-285, at 1322, which outlines the dispute resolution proce-
dures, emphasizes that the underlying principle of the treaty's dispute settlement provision
is that disputes should be resolved by peaceful means chosen by the parties, see id. arts.
279, 280, 281 & 283, para. 1, at 97; Gaertner, The Dispute Settlement Provisions of the
Convention on the Law of the Sea: Critique and Alternatives to the International Tribunal
for the Law of the Sea, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 577, 580-81 (1982). Conciliation is recognized
as one such method of peaceful settlement. See id. at 581-82.
142 See, e.g., OCEANS POLICY, supra note 116, at 1. According to President Reagan, the
United States' decision not to sign the Convention is an expression of the country's refusal
to support a deep seabed mining regime that frustrates the free enterprise system, deters
future development of deep seabed mineral resources, fails adequately to reflect the respec-
tive interests of states, and permits amendments to bind the United States without its ap-
proval. OCEANS POLICY, supra note 116, at 1-2. The source of these shortcomings is the lan-
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the exclusive economic zone, it said that the United States accepts
the concept of such a zone as customary international law, even
though it does not accept the Convention.4 3 In fact, the United
States is willing to accept practically all non-seabed mining provi-
sions of the treaty as customary international law. The Reagan Ad-
ministration has also said that the United States might wish to
adopt some slightly different rules in regard to some of the provi-
sions that, in principle, it is willing to accept. By taking this stand,
the United States might have opened a little loophole, which is
rather dangerous to the consensus established by the treaty, be-
cause if the United States is allowed to make its own rules, other
nations must be too. It would be safer for the United States to
stick to the position announced in connection with the proclama-
tion on the exclusive economic zone that it is willing to consider
the rules of the Convention other than those relating to deep sea-
bed mining to be customary international law binding on all states,
and that it accepts the obligations that follow from these rules,
such as those relating to exclusive economic zones of other
states.14 4 At the same time, however, the United States would ex-
pect others to give it the treaty rights that parallel those obliga-
tions under customary international law.1 5
The United States has also said that it believes that the provi-
sions of the treaty reflect the customary law on non-seabed sub-
jects quite well. This is something of an overstatement, of course,
because some of those rules are clearly new law invented by this
Conference, such as the transit rights through straits and archipel-
agoes and the complicated provisions on the continental shelf and
the exclusive economic zone. Nevertheless, the United States
seems to be saying that a kind of instant international law was
created by the fact that all the nations reached consensus on the
subject at the Law of the Sea Conference-a position that has gen-
eral validity and important implications in other areas of interna-
tional law.
How the treaty'will work in practice remains to be seen, but at
guage in the Convention that the ocean's riches beyond the exclusive economic zone belong
to all mankind.
143See Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,605, 10,605 (1983); see also MacRae,
Customary International Law and the United Nations' Law of the Sea Treaty, 13 CAL.
W.J. INT'L L. 181, 182 (1983).
144 See Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,605, 10,605 (1983).
145 See MacRae, supra note 143, at 182; supra note 143 and accompanying text.
1984]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
this point, one thing is clear-the treaty is going to be binding law,
without any doubt, in regard to 90% of its provisions. The only
strong shadow of doubt that remains is over the deep seabed min-
ing issue. Here, the United States now is proceeding on a course
parallel to the Convention, trying to persuade other industrial
countries to agree on a system outside the treaty that would pro-
tect American investors. But whether it will succeed in this en-
deavor is difficult to predict. Some of America's friends, such as
Australia, Canada, France, and Japan, have already deserted it. 146
Now, the big issue is on which side Germany and Great Britain
will finally land.147
Those of us who have had the privilege to participate in the
Law of the Sea Conference are proud of its many accomplishments
and sad that no attempt is being made to enable the United States
to take part in this great venture. I hope that a day will come when
the United States again will become a leader in creating effective
international legal institutions.
"" See N.Y. Times, May 1, 1982, at 9, col. 2. Canada, France, and Japan are signatories
to the Convention. LAW OF THE SEA BULL., Sept. 1, 1983, at 6-7 (table). Canada, possibly
because its geographical attributes create in it a far-reaching interest in the law of the sea,
has been one of the leaders in supporting, as well as shaping, the new ocean regime pursuant
to UNCLOS. See Buzan, Canada and the Law of the Sea, 11 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L.J. 149,
149-50 (1982). France and Japan, both major industrial nations engaged in seabed mining,
were among the 130 nations that originally voted in favor of adopting the Convention, see
N.Y. Times, May 1, 1982, at 9, col. 2, though Japan did not sign the treaty until Feb. 7,
1983, see LAW OF THE SEA BULL., Sept. 1, 1983, at 7, 9 (table).
I'l See N.Y. Times, May 1, 1982, at 9, col. 2. Great Britain and West Germany have not
yet signed the Convention. LAW OF THE SEA BULL., Sept. 1, 1983, at 7, 9 (table). They were
among the 17 nations that abstained from the vote concerning the adoption of the treaty,
along with the Soviet Union. N.Y. Times, May 1, 1982, at 9, col. 2. The Soviet Union subse-
quently became one of the original signatories, having relinquished its opposition to some
provisions of the Convention. See supra text accompanying note 117.
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